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1Initiating Coordination
Committee members meet to conduct business.  Drivers stay on the right side of the road.
Workers divide the task of painting a house.  These are all examples of coordination.  What
principles of rationality lead individuals to do their parts in a method of coordinating?  Providing
an answer presents a challenge for game theorists.
1.  The Hi-Lo Paradox
Coordination may arise in a sequential game as players respond to each other.  One player
may announce his strategy, and another player may adopt a complementary strategy.  One player
may make a proposal, and another player may accept it.  The first player’s act causes the second
player’s response.  Each player maximizes utility.  The initiator anticipates a positive response,
and the responder profits from providing it.
Avinash Dixit and Susan Skeath (2004: 266–68) demonstrate how communication may solve
a coordination problem.  Communication creates a sequential game with strategies concerning
signals to send and responses to signals.  One player rationally initiates coordination.  He
sincerely announces participation in a form of coordination because he knows his counterpart
will respond in kind.  The announcement is rational because it causes a good response, and
acting as announced is rational because it meets a complementary act.
This paper puts aside coordination in sequential games and treats only coordination in single-
stage noncooperative games.  In such games the players do not causally interact, so coordination
requires an epistemic foundation.  Some theorists hold that classical principles of rationality
2cannot provide that foundation.
Suppose that agents are hyperrational in Howard Sobel’s (1994) sense.  They are moved
only by utility maximization.  Habit, convention, precedence, salience, focal points, and so on
have no effect unless they affect the utilities of options.  These common coordination devices are
ineffective among hyperrational agents.  Such agents respond only to another's participation in
an equilibrium.  None moves toward an equilibrium unless the others do.  None gets the ball
rolling, as Robert Sugden (2000) and Margaret Gilbert (2001) observe.
Andrew Colman (2003) illustrates the problem using the two-person game Hi-Lo, which
Figure 1 depicts.  There are two forms of coordination, one offering a high payoff to each player,
and another offering a low payoff to each player.
High Low
High 2, 2 0, 0
Low 0, 0 1, 1
Figure 1.  Hi-Lo
Classical decision principles give the players no reason to do their parts in the superior
equilibrium (High, High).  Indeed, utility maximization grounds neither coordination
equilibrium.  It fails even granting common knowledge of the payoff matrix and of the players’
utility maximization.  Individual rationality appears not to generate coordination in Hi-Lo.  That
is the Hi-Lo paradox.1
                                                 
1 Donald Regan (1980: 18) presents a similar problem of coordination for two agents committed to the utilitarian
principle of morality.
3This paper resolves the Hi-Lo paradox.  It shows that individual rationality generates
coordination in the game Hi-Lo, at least if agents are ideal and in ideal circumstances.  Unlike
the psychological game theory Andrew Colman advances, it normatively supports coordination
in ideal cases.  The idealizations reveal basic principles of strategic rationality forming the
structure of a general theory that eventually rescinds the idealizations.
In contrast with some approaches to coordination, my approach does not rely on repetition of
games or the bounded rationality of agents.  It does not offer evolutionary explanations of
coordination as, for example, Brian Skyrms (2004) does.  My objective is to explain the
rationality of realizing the superior equilibrium in coordination problems such as the game Hi-
Lo.  This requires an account of the strategic reasoning of agents.  By way of analogy, consider
equilibrium for a ball rolling in a basin with several low spots.  It is easy to show that the ball
will settle in a low spot.  An explanation of its settling in a particular low spot is more complex,
however.  It provides an account of the ball’s travels before coming to rest.  Similarly, an
explanation of an equilibrium’s realization does not show just that an equilibrium is realized but
also provides an account of deliberations leading to the equilibrium’s realization.  An
explanation accounts for the agents’ strategic reasoning and does not just characterize its
outcome.
This paper explains how strategic reasoning in coordination problems leads agents to a Nash
equilibrium, in particular, a payoff-dominant Nash equilibrium.  Of course, explanation must
start somewhere, and I make some assumptions about the agents’ knowledge without explaining
how the agents acquire that knowledge.  I show how strategic reasoning generates coordination
given that agents have some initial knowledge about themselves and their coordination problem.
42.  Commitment
A common view suggests that coordination may arise from commitment to coordination and
to superior forms of coordination when there are multiple forms of coordination.  This section
examines commitment as a method of achieving coordination.  Subsequent sections evaluate
specific applications of the method.
In noncooperative games commitment influences others only if they discover the
commitment despite the absence of communication.  The discovery may arise from the players’
initial knowledge of the game and of the players.  People readily commit to coordination in
games such as Hi-Lo and others know that they do.  Knowledge of the payoff matrix of Hi-Lo is
often enough to lead each player to High.  Does coordination arising this way involve any
irrationality?
Consider first, hyperrational agents.  Unlike humans, hyperrational agents do not perform an
act unless it maximizes utility.  In Hi-Lo the act High does not maximize utility unless one’s
counterpart performs it too.  Hyperrational agents are stuck.  Neither player can use commitment
to initiate coordination.  A hyperrational agent does not have recourse to a pill that induces High,
for instance.  Although it may be rational to take such a pill, it induces behavior not guided by
utility maximization.  Taking such a pill is inconsistent with hyperrationality by definition.  Any
commitment to perform High raises the probability of High.  By definition, a hyperrational agent
increases the probability of High only if High maximizes utility.  So he does not form the
commitment.  The commitment to perform High has good consequences, but hyperrationality
blocks the commitment.
May rational agents, in contrast with hyperrational agents, use commitment to initiate
5coordination?  May any of the commitment devices that humans use, for instance, be applied
without irrationality at any step?  Commitments come in various types.  Perhaps some type of
commitment resolves the Hi-Lo paradox without any irrationality.
Without communication, agents may know the agreement they would reach if they were to
communicate.  That agreement is a focal point of the sort Thomas Schelling (1960) uses to
explain coordination.  Each may decide to do his part in the agreement.  A disposition to decide
this way may be rational to form and to have.  The act it issues is not irrational even if performed
in ignorance of its consequences.  It is as good as alternative acts, given ignorance of the acts of
others.  Moreover, agents with common knowledge of the focal point may expect each other to
do their parts in that strategy profile, and then doing their parts maximizes utility.
The appeal to focal points just sketched suggests a general method of using commitment to
justify coordination.  Suppose that agents begin the game Hi-Lo already equipped with a
disposition to participate in its payoff-dominant Nash equilibrium.  Knowledge about agents may
yield evidence about the strategy profile they will realize.  Each agent is committed to the
payoff-dominant equilibrium.  The other agent knows this.  The commitment is rational to
acquire because each agent knows that the other responds to the commitment by doing her part in
the payoff-dominant equilibrium.  So each agent knows that he will not act alone.  Commitment
gets the ball rolling toward coordination.
Is an agent’s commitment to High rational to have?  It is a commitment to do his part in the
payoff-dominant Nash equilibrium without regard for his partner's act.  The commitment yields
an irrational act if the agent knows his partner will perform Low.  The agent may know that the
adverse circumstances do not obtain, however.  The commitment’s disregard for reasons may not
lead to an act that flies in the face of reason.  So perhaps in favorable cases the commitment is
6rational to maintain as well as to form.
Is it rational for an agent to perform the act the commitment issues?   The agent commits to
his part in the payoff-dominant Nash equilibrium without independent knowledge of his
partner’s part.  Given his commitment, he expects his partner to do her part.  Doing his part in
the payoff-dominant equilibrium then maximizes utility because it arises from a disposition his
partner knows he has, and knowing that she knows is evidence that she will do her part in the
payoff-dominant equilibrium.
This is the general method of coordination through commitment.  It alleges that pre-game
commitment resolves the Hi-Lo paradox for comprehensively rational agents given that they are
informed about each other and their game.  Making the method work requires specifying the type
of commitment and verifying that it leads to coordination without any missteps.
To illustrate the benefit of commitments, consider contracts and promises.  They may be
utility maximizing even if they sometimes issue acts that do not maximize utility.  They may be
rational gambles.  Commitment to perform an act without independent knowledge that the act is
utility maximizing need not result in a violation of the principle of utility maximization.  The
commitment may be a rational gamble, and the act itself may maximize utility.  In Hi-Lo, an
agent’s commitment to High may not result in a violation of the principle of utility
maximization.  Whether it does depends on his information about his partner’s response to his
commitment.  Furthermore, whether his performing High is rational depends on his information
about his partner’s act.  A rational act does not require knowledge that it is utility maximizing.
Given ignorance, rationality requires only that it maximize utility under a quantization of beliefs
and desires.  An agent does not know High’s utility ranking without knowing his partner’s act.
His performing High may maximize utility under a quantization of his beliefs and desires.  Given
7ignorance of his partner’s act, his performing High may be rational.
Although noncooperative games are causally static, they have an inferential dynamics.  A
player may have a commitment to a payoff-dominant Nash equilibrium.   Knowledge of that
commitment may trigger another player’s participation.  The players’ knowledge of their
participation may make it utility maximizing for each to participate.  An agent’s commitment
may be self-enforcing in the sense that if others know about it he has no reason not to honor it.  If
others know what he will do, and respond by following his lead, and he knows that they will,
then he has a reason to honor his commitment.  Honoring it achieves coordination.
A commitment’s formation may be rational because of its good consequences rather than
because of the good consequences of the act it issues.  Consider a commitment to perform an act
regardless of the act’s consequences.  The commitment may be rational because of its
consequences despite its being defectively motivated by the act’s consequences.  The
commitment may be fully rational to have despite the defect in motivation because
circumstances may make the defect acceptable.  Whether the commitment is fully rational
depends on its specification and context.  In favorable circumstances it may be fully rational.
The foregoing appeal to commitment is an incomplete sketch.  Commitment is vague and
metaphorical.  A commitment is a disposition to choose a certain strategy, but there are many
mechanisms for commitment.  Whether a form of commitment is rationally grounded also
depends on the details of rationality’s principles.  Section 3 considers whether team-reasoning
uses an acceptable form of commitment.  Sections 4 and 5 consider whether the commitment
involved in an intention to perform an act rationally yields coordination.  For each type of
commitment yielding coordination, I investigate whether fully rational agents may form,
maintain, and honor the commitment.
83.  Team reasoning
This section examines one way of fleshing out commitment to coordination.  It considers
commitment to a team.  This type of commitment arises through identification with a group and
involves a type of reasoning called team-reasoning.  After describing the way team-reasoning
grounds coordination, I ask whether each step of the process is fully rational.
Michael Bacharach (forthcoming) uses group identification and team-reasoning to resolve the
Hi-Lo paradox.  He argues for realization of the payoff-dominant Nash equilibrium.  His
approach, like mine, is classical and appeals to the players’ strategic reasoning.  The classical
approach, although theoretically attractive, has seemed unworkable.  Bacharach ingeniously
shows how to overcome obstacles to it.  He revises principles of reasoning so that group
identification yields coordination without violating the principles.  His appeal to group
identification is carefully grounded in social psychology.  However, his principles of reasoning
are controversial because they reject individualism.
Bacharach begins by attending to the role of frames in decision-making.  Different agents see
the same decision problem differently, and the difference in their perspectives explains
differences in their decisions.  Framing also explains focal points and so elaborates Thomas
Schelling’s (1960) suggestions concerning coordination.2  The way an agent frames a
coordination problem affects her behavior in the problem.  An agent may see herself as acting
independently of others, or as acting as a member of a team.  The latter perspective resolves the
                                                 
2 Frederic Schick (2003) makes related points about framing.
9Hi-Lo paradox.  If an agent does her part in the strategy profile that best advances team goals,
she does her part in the payoff-dominant equilibrium.
Bacharach turns to social psychology for an account of the features of social interaction that
trigger group identification.  He argues that the game Hi-Lo has those features.  Each player may
be expected to identify with the pair of players.  Then team-reasoning leads each player to High.
Group identification may not resolve every coordination problem, but it yields the superior form
of coordination in Hi-Lo.
Bacharach introduces restricted and circumspect team-reasoning to take account of an
agent’s beliefs about the prospects of other agents’ adopting team-reasoning.  The hedged forms
of team-reasoning respond sensibly to the danger that others will exploit team-reasoners.  They
describe assurances about others that sensible team-reasoning requires.
Bacharach holds that rationality permits, although it does not require, team-reasoning.
Is that reasoning fully rational?  Team-reasoning permits an agent to act contrary to her
preferences.  Such acts violate a basic principle of rationality.  Bacharach holds that an agent
adopting a team perspective does not see herself as acting against her preferences.   She frames
her decision just one way, namely, as advancing the team’s goals.  However an agent may be
simultaneously aware of both her own and collective preferences and may see that advancing
collective preferences conflicts with her own preferences.  In any case, even if an agent with a
team perspective loses sight of her own preferences, the rationality of acting contrary to her own
preferences is hard to defend.
Bacharach appeals to evolution to explain the origin of team-reasoning.  He adopts Elliot
Sober and David Wilson’s (1998) argument for group selection and then claims that team-
reasoning is evolution’s mechanism for group selection among humans.  Team-reasoning is the
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proximate cause of coordination.  Bacharach notes that evolution is likely to yield efficient
mechanisms of group selection and thinks that team-reasoning is efficient.  However, a single
form of reasoning, such as utility maximization, that relies on payoff transformations to achieve
coordination is more efficient than two independent forms of reasoning, such as individual- and
team-reasoning, together with a device for selecting a form of reasoning.  Efficiency suggests
that reasoning follows preferences and that preference revisions assist collective objectives.
Bacharach claims that payoff transformations do not resolve the Hi-Lo paradox, but he has in
mind restricted types of payoff transformation.3  Payoff transformations that make High a
dominant strategy for each player resolve the Hi-Lo paradox.  Certain types of payoff
transformation reconcile team behavior with individual preferences.  Commitment to a team may
generate conciliatory transformations, and through them coordination, without abandoning
individualistic standards of rationality.
When using payoff transformations and the commitments they generate to justify
coordination, the crucial step is establishing the transformations’ rationality.  The classical
tradition, which I am following, puts aside evaluation of basic preferences.  Therefore, rather
than launch an evaluation of payoff transformations, I turn to another account of commitment
and coordination that is also individualistic but does not rely on substantive principles of rational
preference formation.
4.  Intentions
An intention to act is a type of commitment.  In the game Hi-Lo, may an effective intention
                                                 
3 See Colman (2003) for a discussion of the types of payoff transformations Bacharach considers.   See especially
his comments on the “bloated” Hi-Lo game.
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to do one’s part in the superior equilibrium replace a noncognitively grounded disposition to do
one’s part in that equilibrium?  An intention requires less preparation than other dispositions.  An
agent directly controls his intentions, whereas he only indirectly controls his other dispositions.
This section and the next argue that fully rational agents may use intentions to generate
coordination.
To start, I examine intentions.  An intention is a short plan.  So to elucidate intentions, I
review some basic points about plans.  Why does an agent adopt a plan?  To adopt a plan is to
decide now about future acts.  Why not put off decisions about future acts until the times for
them arrive?  May it maximize utility among possible decisions at a time to adopt a plan rather
than postpone decisions about future acts?
Cognitively limited agents have good reasons to adopt plans.  Adopting a plan is a way of
achieving an act.  This way of realizing an act may reduce deliberation costs.  Instead of
deliberating at each moment, an agent just executes her plan to perform the act.  Earlier
deliberations settle her future act.  Because of the costs of continuous deliberation, cognitively
limited agents profit from using plans to realize acts.4
Imperfect agents such as humans also use intentions to improve the rationality of their acts.
A person forms an intention to perform an act to raise the probability of performing the act.
Deliberating to identify a rational act and then forming an intention to perform the act increases
the probability of performing a rational act.
An ideal agent has no cognitive limits but still may gain from forming intentions.  Forming
an intention is a way of creating a reason to act, as Bruno Verbeek (forthcoming) observes.
Intention formation therefore has at least two types of benefit.  First, an intention may prevent
                                                 
4 Michael Bratman (1999: Chap.  2) makes similar points about the role of planning for cognitively limited agents.
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vacillation, which is costly.  For example, in the case of Buridan’s ass, an intention tips the
scales toward a pile of hay.  It ends vacillation.  Second, as the next section argues, forming an
intention may initiate coordination.  Even a perfect agent, who may act in a utility maximizing
way without deliberation or decision, may profit from forming an intention to act because the
intention facilitates coordination.
Forming an intention to perform an act is a type of commitment.  It increases the subjective
probability of the act.  It gives oneself a reason to perform the act.  A rational agent may form an
intention to act because of the consequences of the intention rather than because of the
consequences of the act.  However, intentions require justification by their content.  Whereas a
disposition to act may be rational to have because of its effects alone, an intention to act is
rational to have only if it has both good effects and cognitive support.  That is why Greg Kavka’s
(1983) toxin puzzle is hard to solve.  The intention to drink the toxin, despite its good
consequences, is irrational unless there are good reasons to drink the toxin.
To show that a fully rational agent may form an intention to act, with the objective of giving
himself a reason to act, consider an agent who is indifferent between his options.  He forms an
intention to perform a certain act.  Forming the intention itself has good consequences.  It ends
the decision problem.  The intention also meets cognitive standards.  There is no reason to
rescind it.  Furthermore, there are reasons for the act intended.  Given the intention, the act has
good consequences.  It fulfills an intention.  The act does not promise better consequences than
its rivals prior to the intention, but after forming the intention the act promises better
consequences than its rivals because it alone fulfills an intention.  That extra reason tips the
balance in favor of the act intended.
In a decision problem, options are possible decisions.  A decision is the formation of an
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intention to perform an act.  The decision is certain to be realized if adopted, but the act decided
upon may not be realized despite the intention to perform it.  An intention to act may not be
carried out.  Events may frustrate an intention, or an agent may abandon an intention.
According to a common view, which this section adopts, given full information a plan’s
execution is rational only if its execution is optimal.  Given uncertainty a plan’s execution is
rational only if its execution maximizes utility.  Similarly, given uncertainty a plan’s adoption is
rational only if its adoption maximizes utility.  Its adoption’s outcome typically but not
necessarily includes the plan’s execution.  Because plans adopted may not be executed, the
utility of a plan’s adoption is not necessarily the same as the utility of its execution.  A plan
rational to adopt may be irrational to execute.  Someone who resolutely executes a plan to
retaliate if attacked acts irrationally, if he is attacked and retaliation brings no benefits, even
though the plan’s adoption was rational because of the prospect of deterrence.
Suppose that an agent has irrationally adopted a plan.  Its irrational adoption is an
unacceptable mistake.  The execution of the plan is rational only if it is rational given correction
of that mistake and so, typically, only if it is rational independently of the plan.
A plan rationally adopted is rationally retained if no new relevant consideration arises, such
as a change in the beliefs or desires supporting the plan.  It is irrationally retained if it is
unresponsive to relevant changes in circumstances.  Irrationally retaining a plan is also an
unacceptable mistake.
Under what circumstances is a plan irrationally retained?  Generally, persevering with a plan
is the best way to reach the long-term objective that prompted the plan.  Abandoning or changing
a plan is usually inferior to persevering.  For example, if one wants to go to Chicago and plans to
take the train, then upon arrival at the train station it is generally better to persevere than to adopt
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a new plan to drive to Chicago.  Only salient changes should trigger a review.  The appropriate
level and type of responsiveness is achieved, not by deliberation, but by habits governing
spontaneous review of plans.  One should cultivate habits of spontaneously reopening
deliberations at appropriate moments.  Reopening deliberations too readily is the mistake of
distraction, or irresoluteness.  Excessive resistance to reopening deliberations is the mistake of
obstinacy, or inflexibility.  The optimal habit reopens deliberations when the benefits outweigh
the costs.  The benefits, like the benefits of gathering information, are increases in the expected
value of maximizing utility.  Calculating costs and benefits is costly.  An optimal habit responds
to them without calculation.  Nonoptimal habits, easier to inculcate, respond to them less
reliably.  A rational agent develops the best habits his circumstances permit.  A decision about
execution of an act planned may be rational despite deliberation unjustified by benefits, or
despite lack of deliberation justified by benefits.  It is rational if the agent’s habits of
spontaneously reopening deliberation are rationally aimed at reopening deliberation if and only if
justified by benefits.  A fully rational agent makes no mistakes in retention and execution of an
intention.
5.  Intentions Yielding Coordination
This section shows that rational agents may solve coordination problems because they form
intentions that all foresee.  Moreover, comprehensively rational agents may solve coordination
problems this way because the intentions yielding coordination are rational to form, maintain,
and execute.
In a single-stage noncooperative game such as Hi-Lo, an intention prompts coordination not
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by causally influencing other agents but rather because other agents foresee it.  Foreknowledge
of the intention influences other agents.  Others may know the agent has or will form the
intention.  He may announce his intention prior to the game, or others may know his character
and aptness to form the intention, perhaps, because of his comprehensive rationality.  This
foreknowledge may causally influence the players’ acts.  In the game Hi-Lo all may know that at
least one player is an instigator of coordination.  The instigator gives himself a reason to perform
High by forming the intention to perform High.  The agents may have common knowledge that
at least one agent is this type of instigator.
An intention to do one’s part in High may replace a noncognitively grounded disposition to
do one’s part in High.  The intention requires less preparation than the disposition.  Its origin
relies on decision preparation less than the disposition does.  Reliance on intention is an
attractive alternative to reliance on other forms of decision preparation.  Intentions furnish a type
of commitment an agent easily controls.
Suppose that a player forms the intention to perform the strategy High.  Full rationality
requires the rationality of forming, maintaining, and executing the intention.  It requires more
than utility maximization among strategies in the game.  It evaluates as well the player’s
intention to perform High.  The intention requires grounding in reason and in that respect differs
from a disposition induced by a pill. Without such grounding, the intention provides an
insufficient bootstrapping reason for an act, as Michael Bratman (1987: 24–27) observes.
A player’s intention to perform High has both good consequences and cognitive support
assuming that the other player foresees it.  Given foreknowledge of the intention, the other player
maximizes utility by performing High herself.  Forming the intention to perform High is rational
because it triggers coordination.  The intention to perform High is cognitively supported because
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performing High maximizes utility given that one’s partner performs High.
Compare forming that intention with forming a belief for pragmatic reasons.  Consider, say,
acquiring the belief that one will win a contest.  One acquires the belief so that one will obtain
the performance benefits of confidence.  To be rational, the belief must also be epistemically
justified.  So suppose also that one knows confidence in victory makes one perform well enough
to win.  Then although one forms the belief for pragmatic reasons, one’s holding it is
epistemically justified because having the belief raises its prospects of being true.  It is a self-
fulfilling prophecy.
For another analogy, compare forming the intention to perform High with a self-supporting
belief.  Suppose that I think that I am thinking.  Perhaps before I form the belief I am not
thinking.  After I form the belief, the belief supports itself.  A rational person may form the belief
without reason but may then retain the belief for epistemic reasons because the belief is self-
supporting.  The belief’s rationality does not require supporting evidence prior to its formation
because it provides its own support.
Forming the intention to perform High is utility maximizing given its consequences.  Having
the intention is also rational because of its consequences.  The reasons for having the intention
do not arise from the consequences of performing High but from the consequences of the
intention itself.  Furthermore, performing High is utility maximizing given the intention’s
formation and the response it elicits.  Fully rational agents may form self-supporting beliefs and
intentions because of their good consequences.
A hyperrational agent cannot use an intention to initiate coordination.  Such an agent forms
an intention to perform an act only if the act maximizes utility.  An intention to perform High
raises the probability of High.  By definition, a hyperrational agent increases the probability of
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High only if the act maximizes utility.  So he does not form the intention.  The intention to
perform High has good consequences, but his character prevents it.  He does not form the
intention to perform High because the act does not maximize utility.  It does not maximize utility
unless he forms the intention to perform High and thereby elicits High from his partner.  He has
a chicken-and-egg problem.
Fully rational ideal agents, even perfect agents, can generate reasons by forming intentions.
One creates a reason to perform an act by intending to perform the act.  Fulfillment of an
intention is a reason to act.  An agent’s intention to perform High by itself does not yield a
sufficient reason to perform High.  However, if it gives his partner a reason to perform High
herself, then it gives him a sufficient reason to perform High.  For rational ideal agents informed
about their game and each other, reasons to perform High are mutually reinforcing.  Having the
intention to perform High furnishes a new reason to perform High.  Knowledge of the intention
gives one’s partner a reason to perform High.  Her performing High gives one a reason to
perform Hi, and so on.  The intention increases the probability of Hi, and an increase is all it
takes to get the ball rolling toward coordination.
Fully rational agents may generate reasons by forming intentions.  They may form, have, and
execute intentions to do their parts in optimal methods of coordination.  The commitments their
intentions constitute resolve coordination problems.
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